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Reactive identitya b s t r a c t
The issues of migration and immigrant political integration in western democracies have
become increasingly intertwined with debates on religion, particularly Islam. To date, how-
ever, we have surprisingly little systematic research on how religious beliefs are related to
immigrants’ political engagement. In this study, we argue that religion has a capacity to
mobilize immigrants politically but the strength of this relationship depends on immigrant
generation, religiosity, and the type of religion. Using survey data collected as part of the
European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2010 in 18 West European democracies, our analyses
reveal that religion is indeed linked to political engagement of immigrants in a complex
way: while belonging to a religion is generally associated with less political participation,
exposure to religious institutions appears to have the opposite effect. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that, compared to foreign-born Muslims, second-generation Muslim immigrants are not
only more religious and more politically dissatisﬁed with their host countries, but also that
religiosity is more strongly linked to their political engagement. This relationship, however,
is limited to uninstitutionalized political action.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
International migration has altered the social make up of western democracies. Many European countries, such as Austria,
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, and Sweden, now record proportions of foreign-born residents as high as or
even higher than in traditional immigration countries, like the United States (Lemaitre and Thoreau, 2006). While some for-
eigners arrive from the EU member states, others come from increasingly more distant and diverse countries, contributing to
the growing cultural and religious diversity of immigrant receiving nations (Castles and Miller, 2009). One consequence of
international migration over the last few decades is that Muslims have become the largest religious group beside Christians
among immigrants in Europe. According to 2010 Pew Research Center estimates, Europe (excluding Turkey) is now home to
44.1 million Muslims (about 6% of the total population), up from 29.6 million in 1990 (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 121).1
The growing share of immigrants with distinct religious beliefs has upended many comfortable and well-worn practices
and ways of thinking in western democracies, and has challenged governments to contend with the practicalities of accept-
ing and integrating immigrants. Tensions have arisen over such issues as the place of religion in the public sphere of society,
the rights and obligations of immigrants, their commitment to democratic governance and gender equality, as well as links
to religious extremist and terrorist organizations. These issues have taken on increased signiﬁcance over time, as religiosity
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immigrants embracing their religious identities even stronger than their foreign-born parents (Voas and Fleischmann,
2012). Moreover, a number of recent events – for example, the 2006 protests against the Danish cartoons, mass rallies in
support of women’s right to wear veils in public, lobbying for building new mosques, and even the 2005 London bombings,
to name a few2 – all suggest that religious beliefs may play a role in motivating political action among newcomers in many
contemporary democracies.
Although immigrant political engagement in Europe has become the focus of growing scholarly literature in recent years,
in large part because of the availability of the European Social Survey data since 2002 (e.g. Just and Anderson, 2012; de Rooij,
2012; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012; Aleksynska, 2011; Voicu and Serban, 2012), there is surpris-
ingly little systematic research on the role that religion plays in shaping immigrant political behavior. Speciﬁcally, while
some scholars take into account respondents’ belonging to some religious denominations (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano,
2011; Aleksynska, 2011; Voicu and Serban, 2012),3 no studies to our knowledge simultaneously analyze the consequences
of religion in a form of religious beliefs, religiosity, and exposure to religious institutions in shaping immigrant political partic-
ipation in Europe. Moreover, scholars usually focus either on foreigners (e.g., Just and Anderson, 2012; Aleksynska, 2011; de
Rooij, 2012), or second-generation immigrants (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Fleischmann et al., 2011), but rarely both,4 pre-
venting us from systematic comparisons across immigrant generations. As a consequence, we do not know with much certainty
whether believers among immigrants in Europe engage in politics more or less than secular immigrants do, whether this is
equally true across immigrant generations and religious groups, and whether these differences – if they in fact exist – are af-
fected by the nature and intensity of religious beliefs, exposure to religious institutions, immigrant experiences with their host
and origin countries, or by something else entirely.
Below, we address these questions by examining the role of religion, particularly Islam, in motivating political participa-
tion among immigrants in West European democracies. We argue that religion has the capacity to mobilize immigrants
politically but the strength of this relationship depends on immigrant generation, religiosity, and the type of religion. We
test our arguments using cross-national and individual-level data collected as part of the European Social Survey (ESS)
2002–2010 in 18 West European democracies. Our analyses reveal that religion is indeed linked to political participation
of immigrants in a complex way: while belonging to a religion is generally associated with less political participation, expo-
sure to religious institutions has the opposite effect. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, compared to foreign-born Muslims, second-gen-
eration Muslim immigrants are not only more religious and more dissatisﬁed with their host countries, but also that
religiosity helps to activate their political engagement. This relationship, however, is limited uninstitutionalized forms of
political action.
Our study contributes to scholarly literature in several ways. First, on a theoretical level, we highlight the complex yet
important role that religion plays in shaping immigrants’ political engagement in contemporary democracies. In doing so,
we seek to contribute to a relatively slim body of cross-national research on when and how religion matters in politics
(Bellin, 2008; Wald and Wilcox, 2006; Grzymala-Busse, 2012). Second, we go beyond extant studies by systematically ana-
lyzing the consequences of religion in the form of individuals’ religiosity, exposure to religious institutions, and religion
type, and test their consequences on political engagement among ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants. Third, by dis-
tinguishing theoretically and empirically between different kinds of political acts, we extend the scholarly focus beyond
electoral participation – a type of political action most immigrants are not entitled to – and develop a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the determinants of immigrant political engagement. Finally, our analysis goes beyond existing
studies, which tend to focus on one or a small number of countries or cities, and puts existing arguments to a more
demanding empirical test against a varied and extensive sample of European states with diverse immigrant groups and
sizable Muslim populations.
Our paper proceeds as follows: in the next sections, we formulate and develop our argument; we then describe our data
and measures, present analyses and results, and ﬁnally conclude by discussing the implications of our ﬁndings and offering
suggestions for further research.2 We do not claim that these events are in any way representative of Muslim political participation or that some acts, such as protests against the Danish
cartoons, were exclusive to or more prominent in West European democracies than elsewhere in the world. Instead, our only intention here is to highlight some
of the more publicized events where immigrants’ political engagement appears to be linked to religious beliefs, suggesting that the relationship between
religion and immigrant political activism deserves a closer investigation.
3 For example, in analyzing political participation among second-generation immigrants, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) control for being a Catholic, Protestant,
and Orthodox, but do not account for Muslims or individuals belonging to other faiths. Instead, the authors combine non-religious and other believers into a
single category and treat them as a reference group for the three Christian denominations. In a study of immigrant engagement in voluntary associations, Voicu
and Serban (2012) similarly identify Protestants and Catholics, while treating all other respondents (both secular individuals and respondents belonging to
other religions, including Muslims) as a reference category.
4 Voicu and Serban (2012) is one such exception, as their study identiﬁes ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants, and analyzes them along with natives.
However, the focus of their study is limited to engagement in voluntary associations, and it is unclear to what extent their ﬁndings generalize to a wider range
of political activities. Moreover, while their empirical models account for differences in the levels of participation of ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants in
comparison to natives, they do not systematically analyze variation in the slopes of their independent variables across immigrant generations. As a consequence,
we do not know, for example, whether religion is more strongly linked to political participation among second-generation immigrants as opposed to foreign-
born.
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Studies of political participation have long acknowledged that individuals do not participate if they cannot, do not want
to, or if nobody asked (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Leighley, 1995). Religion matters for political participation be-
cause it has consequences for each of these considerations, although not always in the direction that enables political action.
We posit that, generally speaking, while religion is linked to resources and mobilization networks that facilitate political par-
ticipation, it is also associated with a worldview that may give priority to religious life over worldly affairs, creating fewer
motivations for believers to engage in politics compared to secular individuals. The overall relationship of religion to political
engagement depends on the strength of these competing forces.
Existing research tends to emphasize the resource and mobilization aspects of religion and considers religion as a classic
predictor of political engagement. Theories of electoral behavior based on social cleavages suggest that political parties
mobilize voters along religious lines (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Converse, 1974; Lijphart, 1979). Dis-
agreements over moral issues, doctrinal conﬂicts among different denominations, and introduction of compulsory secular
education in the aftermath of the French Revolution gave rise to important Christian Democratic parties that sought to de-
fend religious values and the moral authority of religious institutions in western democracies. These parties grew into broad
mass movements after the introduction of universal suffrage and were able to claim the loyalties of remarkably high propor-
tions of the churchgoers in the working class, particularly among women (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 15). Although secu-
larization has eroded much of the traditional social base of these parties, religious cleavage remains a considerable force in
structuring party politics and voting behavior (Minkenberg, 2010; Knutsen, 2004).5
The link between religion and political action, however, is not limited to the mobilizing efforts of political parties. Re-
search from the United States reveals that religious organizations also play a central role. Some studies demonstrate that
religious institutions increase people’s engagement in politics because they help individuals develop resources – civic skills,
political efﬁcacy, and political knowledge – that enable their political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995;
Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Others reveal that religious organizations are important because they create social networks,
norms, and expectations that encourage participation, and sometimes directly recruit members into political action, as was
the case with African American churches at the time of the civil rights movement (e.g., Djupe and Grant, 2001; Peterson,
1992; Harris, 1994; Norris, 2002, Ch. 9).6
Whether these ﬁndings extend to countries outside the United States has been questioned by subsequent research, how-
ever. A number of scholars point out that the United States is an exceptional case among western democracies due to its high
levels of religiosity, vigorous competition among religious groups, and the fact that being religious is closely linked to Amer-
ican identity (cf. Voas and Fleischmann, 2012, pp. 529–530; Foner and Alba, 2008). As a consequence, while religious orga-
nizations play an important role in facilitating immigrants’ integration (Hirschman, 2004) and stimulating their civic and
political engagement in the United States (Jamal, 2005; Foley and Hoge, 2007), they may be less able or motivated to play
this role in predominantly secular countries where religious identities and symbols are seen with unease in the public sphere
(e.g., Cesari, 2004).
Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect that religious institutions play an important role in mobilizing immigrants for
political action in Western Europe as well. Research shows that European governments have increasingly engaged in a for-
mal dialogue with religious leaders to promote integration and peaceful coexistence of different religions (Klausen, 2005;
Permoser et al., 2010; Laurence, 2006). These ofﬁcial efforts to cooperate combined with the ability of religious institutions
to provide believers with resources, networks, and political cues, suggest that people’s exposure to religious institutions
should be associated with higher levels of their engagement in political action. We therefore hypothesize that attendance
of religious services should contribute positively to immigrants’ political participation in their host societies (Hypothesis 1).
While exposure to religious institutions can be expected to increase people’s participation in politics, belonging to a reli-
gion may have the opposite effect. Research on Muslim political participation indicates that some Muslims deliberately re-
frain from political action because they consider it as Haram (forbidden) for believers (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004).
Speciﬁcally, some Muslims perceive political participation in western democracies as a challenge to the Quran’s teaching
that believers are forbidden to accept the authority of the disbelievers over them. The act of voting in secular societies is seen
as particularly subversive to Muslim identity because it signals direct engagement with the political system of nonbelievers.7
A negative relationship between religious afﬁliation and political action may not be limited to Muslims if we consider that
religious afﬁliation encourages people to value godly matters above world affairs, and to view religious life as an alternative
to political participation (e.g., Barnes et al., 1979, pp. 118–119).8 Consistent with this perspective, literature on social5 The role that political parties play in mobilizing political engagement among immigrants is less clear, as many immigrants, especially foreign-born
individuals, do not have citizenship, cannot vote in national elections, and therefore cannot provide immediate electoral support for political parties competing
for public ofﬁce at the national level.
6 Religious organizations have been regarded as particularly important for individuals of low socio-economic status and minority groups that might
otherwise be more marginalized politically (Brady et al., 1995; Norris, 2002, p. 220). Consistent with this perspective, Voicu and Serban (2012) found that
immigrants are more likely to join religious organizations than other voluntary associations.
7 This issue, however, remains contentious among Muslims, with some arguing in favor of political engagement as a way to express their legitimate interests
and improve their situation in host societies (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Ramadan, 2004).
8 Historically, political disengagement of pious individuals in Europe was reinforced by the Catholic Church, which initially had a strong distaste for political
parties and popular mobilization, in part because they challenged the church’s hierarchical control over Catholics (Kalyvas, 1996).
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cept when they feel compelled to react to attacks on sacred-values and anti-religious practices that interfere with their ability to
live godly lives (e.g., Wald et al., 2005, p. 130; see also McVeigh and Sikkink, 2001). Other studies also show that religious indi-
viduals believe that the world is just and that people generally get what they deserve (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2006). This view suggests that believers may be less inclined to blame governments for social ills and economic fail-
ures than secular individuals, and consequently may be less motivated to engage in politics as a way to reward or punish polit-
ical actors for their performance while in ofﬁce. Our second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) is therefore that believers should be less
politically engaged than secular individuals.
Islam, religiosity, and second-generation immigrants
Whether as a consequence of decolonization, political unrest, or economic hardships in Northern Africa, South East Asia,
and the Middle East, Muslims have become the largest religious group beside Christians among immigrants in Europe (Pew
Research Center, 2011). Practicing Islam – a religion that is often seen as foreign or ‘‘imported’’ by Europeans (Eggert and
Giugni, 2011) – requires a number of special provisions such as permitting religious clothing and symbols in public places,
establishing new mosques and Islamic cemeteries, as well as ensuring access to faith-based education, to name a few (e.g.,
Maussen, 2007; Buijs and Rath, 2006; Nielsen, 1999). Although European countries vary in the degree to which they have
been able to accommodate Islam (e.g., Fetzer and Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2005), Muslims still face many challenges in a widely
secularized and traditionally Christian environment that characterizes established democracies in Europe (Foner and Alba,
2008; Buijs and Rath, 2002).
Considering the outsider status and lack of accommodation of Islam in Western Europe, Muslim immigrants may feel
more alienated from the politics of their host societies and therefore participate in politics less than Christian immigrants.
At the same time, however, we would expect considerable heterogeneity within religious groups, as not all believers are
equality motivated or able to engage politically. Since securing an institutional and cultural environment in which Muslims
can properly practice their faith should be more important for Muslims who are highly religious, we expect religiosity to
interact with Muslim identity. This means that religiosity should increase the positive effect (or at least reduce the negative
effect) that belonging to Islam may have on immigrant engagement in politics of their host societies (Hypothesis 3).
Furthermore, we posit that the propensity of religious Muslims to engage politically should be more pronounced among
second-generation immigrants, as they possess more resources and stronger motivation to achieve their policy goals than
foreign-born individuals. Speciﬁcally, being born and socialized in their host country, second-generation immigrants are
likely to have a better understanding of the rules and regulations governing their country’s politics and of the ways in which
ordinary individuals can inﬂuence the political process. In addition, they tend to be more proﬁcient in the ofﬁcial language
and may have more opportunities for political engagement in comparison to foreign-born individuals whose immediate con-
cerns of getting settled – ﬁnding housing and employment – may leave little time for other activities.
Better skills and resources, however, are only one part of the story in our explanation why second-generation immigrants
should engage in political action more than foreign-born individuals. Another part has to do with motivation resulting from a
sense of entitlement among locally born immigrants. In contrast to ﬁrst-generation immigrants who typically arrive with
positive attitudes towards their host countries due to their self-selection into migration (Maxwell, 2010; see also Dancygier
and Saunders, 2006), by deﬁnition, second-generation immigrants did not choose to migrate – they were born in their host
countries. The native status makes them feel more entitled to the same treatment as majority populations, and less inclined
to tolerate discrimination, social marginalization, and injustice than ﬁrst-generation immigrants. Existing research shows
that second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe indeed report higher levels of perceived discrimination than for-
eign-born Muslims do (cf., Voas and Fleischmann, 2012, p. 536).
While grievances might have a direct effect on political action, as some traditional accounts of protest activity suggest
(e.g. Gurr, 1970), perceptions of unfair treatment and social exclusion may also operate on political participation indirectly,
that is, via reactive religious identity. The idea of reactive identity is not new in social science research. Scholarly literature on
immigrant integration in the United States developed the notion of reactive ethnicity, suggesting that group consciousness
among second-generation immigrants increases in response to social marginalization (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Kurien,
2005; Portes and Zhou, 1993). The notion of reactive identity has been subsequently extended to the religious domain,
and evidence of reactive religiosity was found both in the United States and Europe (Haddad, 2007; Diehl and Koenig,
2009; Peek, 2005; Open Society Foundation, 2011; Fleischmann et al., 2011). For example, Diehl and Koenig (2009) reveal
that religious identity is remarkably resilient among Turkish immigrants in Germany, and ﬁnd support for the theory of reli-
gion as a compensatory strategy among socially marginalized second-generation immigrants. Perceptions of discrimination
were found to also contribute to a strengthened Muslim identity among European-born Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in
urban areas of Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Fleischmann et al., 2011), although there is some evidence that this
relationship weakens when childhood religious socialization is taken into account (Fleischmann and Phalet, 2012). Similarly,
interviews with Muslim women in France showed that the majority of second-generation Muslim women chose to wear the
veil as a reaction to the debates over head scarves in public spaces (Open Society Foundation, 2011).99 The adoption of the headscarf among young Muslim women reportedly has also increased in the United States after September 11, 2001 as a symbol of
allegiance to Islamic identity (Haddad, 2007; Peek, 2005).
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ination strengthen identiﬁcation with the threatened in-group as a way for devalued group members to counteract the neg-
ative consequences discrimination has on their self-esteem (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt and Branscombe, 2002).
Religious identity is particularly well suited to enhance individuals’ subjective well-being due to the fact that it offers a com-
forting and compelling worldview, a robust social support system, and a unique form of psychological enrichment (Ysseldyk
et al., 2010, p. 67). Consistent with this view, a number of studies documented that Muslims’ perceptions of unfair treatment
and social exclusion in Europe revitalize religious identity among second-generation immigrants (Fleischmann et al., 2011;
Diehl and Koenig, 2009; Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007; but see Fleischmann and Phalet, 2012), and consequently strengthen
their readiness to engage in political action to defend Islamic values (Fleischmann et al., 2011, p. 641).10 Drawing on insights
from this literature, we therefore hypothesize that the positive relationship being a religious Muslim and political engagement
should be more pronounced among second-generation immigrants than among foreign-born individuals (Hypothesis 4).
The varieties of political action
While early studies of political participation in democracies focused mostly on understanding standard modes of political
engagement, such as electoral participation, the scope of inquiry into political engagement widened considerably in the
aftermath of popular unrest during the 1960s and 1970s, as researchers began to take into account a broader repertoire
of political acts, including protest behavior. This expansion of focus brought with it the conceptual distinction between
the traditional conventional, institutionalized acts of participation on the one hand, and unconventional, uninstitutionalized,
acts on the other (Barnes et al., 1979; Muller, 1979). Institutionalized action is usually deﬁned as involving routine political
acts (mostly) oriented toward the electoral processes, while uninstitutionalized participation is conceptualized as taking
place outside of electoral politics and often involving more spontaneous, episodic, and disruptive political acts (Kaase, 1989).
Considering the options for political engagement available to individuals, one important question is what motivates any
particular act. Traditionally, in the context of established democracies, conventional political activities such as voting have
been viewed as acts that afﬁrm individuals’ allegiance to the political system. Consistent with this view, considerable evi-
dence shows a strong correlation between positive attitudes about politics and the political system on one hand and partic-
ipation in conventional political activities on the other (Leighley, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Finkel, 1985; Verba
et al., 1978). Conversely, a number of studies have found that mistrust and political grievances increase engagement in
unconventional political acts (Gamson, 1968; Muller, 1977; Milbrath and Goel, 1977). Moreover, the connection between
political discontent and unconventional participation appears to be particularly pronounced among political and ethnic
minorities (Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Shingles, 1981). This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that unconventional politics
has traditionally provided an outlet for disadvantaged minorities, as well as other groups that lack access to politics through
conventional channels and are alienated from the established political order (Dalton, 2006, pp. 62–63). And while uninsti-
tutionalized political action has broadened from the disadvantaged to include a wider spectrum of society (Van Aelst and
Walgrave, 2001; Norris, 2002, p. 201) and has become an accepted form of engagement in contemporary democracies
(Barnes et al., 1979; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998), it remains a powerful tool for the expression of grievances among disaffected
minorities as it conveys high levels of information with real political force (Dalton, 2006, Ch. 3).11,12
In light of this literature and the fact thatMuslims remain a distinctminority in largely secularized and traditionally Christian
WestEuropeansocieties,wehypothesize thatbeinga religiousMuslimshouldbemorestrongly linkedtouninstitutionalized than
institutionalizedpolitical acts (Hypothesis 5). Thismeans thatwe should observe a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
of the interactionbetweenreligiosityand Islam in themodelsofuninstitutionalizedpolitical action, anda substantivelyweakeror
statistically insigniﬁcant estimate of this interaction in the models of institutionalized political acts.
Data and measures
The individual level data employed in our analyses come from the European Social Survey (ESS) collected 2002–2010 (1–4
round cumulative ﬁle) (Jowell et al., 2007). The ESS project is known for its high standards of methodological rigor in survey
design and cross-national data collection (Kittilson, 2009).13 Strict random sampling of individuals regardless of nationality,
citizenship, language, or legal status is used to ensure representativeness of national populations.14 Moreover, our analyses10 Interestingly, research from the United States indicates with growing religious diversity religion has replaced ethnicity as the most important identity
marker for the second and higher generations among the post-1965 immigrants (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Jeung et al., 2012; Peek, 2005).
11 To say that individuals who previously participated in politics via institutionalized channels now also do so via less institutionalized forms of political
action is not to say that disadvantaged minorities have similarly expanded their repertoire of political action from less to more institutionalized participation.
For disadvantaged minorities, contentious political action may still be their primary route of communicating their demands to policy makers.
12 To be sure, being disaffected or holding grievances is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for an individual’s engagement in protest behavior (McAdam
et al., 1996; McAdam et al., 2010). Research shows that only a small proportion of the people holding grievances participate, as engagement in contentious
action depends on individual and organizational resources (Dalton, 2006; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Norris, 2002, p. 201; McCarthy and Zald, 1977),
emancipative values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel and Deutsch, 2011), the nature of a movement, political opportunity structures, and macro-economic
development (Eisinger 1973; McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2004, 2006; Dalton et al., 2010; Dalton and Van Sickle, 2005; Kitschelt, 1986; Giugni, 2007).
13 It is based on hour-long face-to-face interviews and survey questions designed for optimal cross-national comparability.
14 We base our analyses on respondents aged 18 or older to ensure that they are of legal age to engage in all forms of political acts. Estimating our models
using all respondents (that is, aged 15 or older), however, does not change our ﬁndings.
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the only set of cross-national surveys that include questions designed speciﬁcally for immigrants as well as standard items mea-
suring respondents’ religiosity, religion, attendance of religious services, and political participation. Finally, it is the only set of
surveys that ask these questions in identical format across a broad range of countries. The relevant survey items were available
for 18 West European democracies: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. In the sections to follow we include
short descriptions of the main groups of variables. These are primarily items from the survey questionnaires, but we also include
macro variables as they are relevant to test hypotheses about effects of country characteristics.Dependent variables
To account for the varieties of political action and also for the fact that the number of political acts people engage in is
relatively low, we measured political participation in several ways. First, we constructed an additive index based on whether
a respondent reported having done the following over the course of the last year: contacted a politician or government ofﬁ-
cial, worked in a political party or action group, worked in another organization or association, signed a petition, took part in
a lawful public demonstration, and boycotted certain products.16 The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating
more political engagement.
Since we hypothesized that the effects of religion will vary across different types of political action, we also separate the
index of participatory acts into institutionalized and uninstitutionalized forms of political action (following the distinction
made by Barnes et al., 1979, pp. 59–60; see also Dalton, 2006). Institutionalized political action is measured by an additive
index of the following three activities respondents reported having engaged in during the last year: contacted a politician or
government ofﬁcial, worked for a political party or action group, and worked for another organization or association. The
uninstitutionalized participation index is similarly based on the following three types of political acts: signed a petition, took
part in a lawful demonstration, and boycotted products. Both measures of participation range from 0 to 3, with higher values
indicating more political engagement.
Independent variables
We rely on several survey items to measure people’s religious beliefs. First, respondents were asked if they consider
themselves as belonging to any particular religion or denomination. If they said ‘‘yes’’, they were then asked to specify their
religion or denomination. Using responses to these questions, we created dichotomous variables for Christians, Muslims, and
other religions, and relied on non-religious as a reference category for religious groups in our empirical analyses. Further, we
measure respondents’ religiosity using the following survey question: ‘‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular reli-
gion, how religious would you say you are?’’ Responses to this question were coded on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher val-
ues indicating stronger religiosity. Finally, to capture the exposure to religious institutions, we relied on the following survey
item: ‘‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services now-
adays?’’ We have reversed the original coding categories of this variable so that it ranges from 0 (never) to 6 (every day), that
is, with higher values indicating more frequent attendance of religious services.
To examine whether immigrant generation interacts with religion and religiosity in shaping political participation, we
distinguish between ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants were identiﬁed using the survey
question ‘‘Were you born in this country?’’ and coded 1 if respondents reported being foreign-born, 0 – otherwise.17 Second-
generation immigrants are individuals who reported that they were born in their country of residence but whose one or both
parents were foreign-born.Control variables
Our statistical analyses control for a range of variables identiﬁed as consistent determinants of political participation in
past research. Since the research literature on political action is huge, we must limit our review to some of the standard15 We calculated the percentages of foreign-born respondents in the ESS sample and compared these to data measuring the actual percentages of foreign-born
individuals from the 2001 Census data, available from the European Union’s statistical agency, Eurostat. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of
foreign-born individuals in the surveys and foreign-born residents according to Eurostat Census ﬁgures in the countries included in our study was 0.98,
indicating an extremely close ﬁt between survey and ofﬁcial statistics. Secondly, using a question about respondents’ country of origin, we examined the extent
to which our samples of foreign-born respondents were representative of populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percentages of
individuals from different regions of the world: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New
Zealand, and Western Europe. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign-born individuals in our surveys from speciﬁc regions and the
Eurostat data on foreign-born residents in the countries from these regions was 0.90, indicating yet again a very close ﬁt between survey and ofﬁcial statistics.
For more details about individual countries, please contact the authors. Other studies that relied on ESS samples of immigrants to study their attitudes and
behaviour include Wright and Bloemraad (2012), de Rooij (2012), Maxwell (2010), Just and Anderson (2012), Connor (2010), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), and
Aleksynska (2011).
16 Voting turnout is not included because many foreign-born are not citizens and therefore do not have a legal right to vote in national elections.
17 Foreign-born with both native-born parents were excluded from the analyses, although doing so does not change our ﬁndings.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 133arguments and main empirical contributions. Generally speaking, people are more likely to participate in a variety of modes
of political action if they have the necessary resources and motivation to get involved. The most prominent proxy for re-
sources has been socio-economic status (Verba et al., 1995), and a substantial literature documents that education and social
status (measured by income or class) have a positive impact on political engagement across a variety of countries (Almond
and Verba, 1963; Jennings et al., 1989; Nie et al., 1971). Participation also generally increases with age, although it declines
slightly among the elderly (Verba and Nie, 1972). Furthermore, researchers have found that men are more likely to have the
resources needed to engage in politics (Dalton, 2006), and that gender stereotypes have traditionally contributed to a greater
proclivity of men to be politically involved (Hansen, 1997; Jennings, 1983).
In addition to standard demographic variables, our models include measures of social incorporation found to be impor-
tant for political participation (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone, 1980; Ramakrishnan, 2005, esp. Ch. 4). The unemployed tend to
participate less not just because they tend to have lower incomes but also because they do not participate in social networks
in the workplace that reward political participation. Further, marital status has been found to have the strongest effect on
political involvement among those who only need a slight push to participate – for example, those with low levels of edu-
cation (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone, 1980). Moreover, we include a direct measure of social connectedness based on a survey
item indicating how often a respondent meets socially with friends, relatives, or work colleagues (Bloemraad, 2006). To cap-
ture the effects of social and political grievances in motivating political action (Gurr, 1970; Bateson, 2012; Dalton et al., 2010;
Dalton and van Sickle, 2005), we rely on measures of perceived discrimination, being a crime victim, satisfaction with the
way democracy works in one’s country, as well as the extremity of one’s ideological views.
To account for immigrant-speciﬁc experiences, our models control for citizenship, as citizens are expected to be more en-
gaged in the politics of their host countries due to lower costs and stronger motivation to participate (Just and Anderson,
2012; DeSipio, 1996). Length of stay in a host country also matters because it is associated with more exposure and famil-
iarity with a political system, as well as a stronger sense of having a stake in the host country’s politics, all of which stimulate
civic and political action (White et al., 2008; Liang, 1994; Bueker, 2005; Bass and Casper, 2001; Aleksynska, 2011; Voicu and
Serban, 2012). Moreover, to control for foreigners’ socialization experiences prior to arrival, we include a measure of the level
of democracy in immigrants’ countries of origin, as less democratic regimes usually provide their citizens with fewer oppor-
tunities to be socialized into democratic norms, a weaker sense of civic responsibility, and a lack of skills and knowledge
necessary for political engagement in liberal democracies (White et al., 2008; Black, 1987; Black et al., 1987; Ramakrishnan,
2005, p. 91; Bueker, 2005). Finally, we include a dichotomous variable measuring whether an immigrant has one foreign-
born parent as opposed to two foreign-born parents because immigrants with one native-born parent might be better inte-
grated in their host society and consequently participate in politics more. Although we cannot include measures of all rel-
evant background experiences of immigrants, we are conﬁdent that our indicators tap into the most relevant experiences
identiﬁed by previous research.
At the macro-level, existing literature also suggests taking into account a country’s level of economic development (mea-
sured by the GDP per capita) and economic performance (annual percentage of GDP growth), since participation rates and
involvement tend to increase with higher levels of development and better economic conditions (Almond and Verba, 1963;
Lipset, 1994; Norris, 2002; Dalton et al., 2010). Country’s political opportunity structure in our sample of advanced indus-
trialized democracies is captured using a measure of government effectiveness. We include this variable because people have
been found to engage in political action more in countries where they perceive governments to be better capable of respond-
ing to public demands (Dalton and van Sickle, 2005). Finally, the size of foreigner population in a country is used to account
for collective action problems in larger immigrant groups (Olson, 1971), while a country’s average level of political partic-
ipation is designed to capture the consequences of any remaining forces that generally shape political engagement of mass
publics. Details on coding procedures for all variables are listed in the appendix.
Analysis and results
Combining information collected at the levels of individuals and countries means that our data has a multi-level structure
(where one unit of analysis, the individual, is nested within another unit – the country). The results of a variance-compo-
nents model (ANOVA) reveal that there is statistically signiﬁcant variation in the levels of political participation at both mi-
cro and macro levels of analysis, suggesting that a multi-level model is preferred to an ordinary regression.18 To avoid a
number of statistical problems associated with such a data structure, including clustering, non-constant variance, and incorrect
(usually underestimated) standard errors (cf. Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002), we rely on multi-level
models with random intercepts (to account for cross-country heterogeneity in the levels of political participation) and immi-
grants nested within their countries of residence.
A ﬁrst look at the data in Fig. 1 reveals that, consistent with previous research, the overall levels of political engagement
are relatively low: the mean values are .920 for political action, and .386 and .535 – for institutionalized and uninstitution-
alized participation in politics. However, examining political participation by immigrant generation reveals marked differ-
ences: while, on average, ﬁrst-generation immigrants are least involved in (nonelectoral) politics (with a score of .737 on
the political action scale), participation is signiﬁcantly higher among second-generation immigrants (1.096), who engage18 Both variance components are statistically signiﬁcant for all three dependent variables using full sample of respondents as well as in split sample
estimations by immigrant generation (the results are available upon request from the authors).
Fig. 1. Mean number of political acts by immigrant generation and action type in 18 West European democracies.
134 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144in politics even more than native populations (.924). Looking at the underlying distribution by action type indicates that high
levels of political participation among second-generation immigrants are due to their high involvement in uninstitutional-
ized action: the mean value is .691 in comparison to .475 for foreign-born and .529 for natives. Engagement in institution-
alized political acts is also the highest among second-generation immigrants (.407), but natives are only slightly behind
(.396), while foreigners are least politically involved (.263). Overall, however, uninstitutionalized political participation is
more widespread among immigrants of both generations as well as natives than institutionalized political action, and is par-
ticularly high among second-generation immigrants.
Descriptive statistics of our main independent variables among ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants show that, on
average, Muslims are more religious than Christians: the mean values of religiosity are 6.832 for Muslims, 6.194 for Chris-
tians, while newcomers belonging to other religions fall in-between with a score of 6.272.19 Religiosity also varies by immi-
grant generation: foreign-born individuals are on average more religious (5.423) than second-generation immigrants (4.630).
However, these numbers mask considerable differences between religious groups. Speciﬁcally, as Fig. 2 reveals, religiosity is
higher among second-generation Muslim immigrants compared to foreign-born Muslims: the respective scores are 7.072
and 6.774. In contrast, the pattern is reversed when we compare ﬁrst- and second-generation Christian immigrants: the respec-
tive values are 6.374 vs. 5.963, and the same is true for other religions where the drop from the ﬁrst- to the second-generation is
even larger (6.431 vs. 5.722). Taken together, the descriptive statistics reveal that second-generation immigrants are more polit-
ically involved than foreigners (and natives), and that religiosity is higher among second- than ﬁrst-generation Muslim immi-
grants, while the pattern with respect to religiosity is reversed among immigrants of other faiths.
To examine the links between religion, immigrant generation, and political participation with more precision, our anal-
ysis proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate our models using information for all respondents in all countries. We do so to
establish a baseline for the impact of religion, religiosity, and exposure to religious institutions on political participation, and
to see whether ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants are statistically distinguishable from the natives. As a second step,
we turn exclusively to immigrants, and analyze whether the relationship between religion and political participation varies
across immigrant generations. Speciﬁcally, we seek to assess whether religiosity is indeed more strongly linked to political
engagement among second-generation Muslim immigrants than among foreign-born Muslims or newcomers of other faiths.
Finally, we report the results by action type to test whether religion is more powerfully associated with immigrant engage-
ment in uninstitutionalized than institutionalized political acts. It is worth noting that due to the difﬁculties in disentangling
the reciprocal effects between religion and political engagement using our data, the results in this part should be interpreted
as correlations rather than causal effects.
Baseline models
To assess the relationships between our key independent and dependent variables across all countries and all respon-
dents in our base-line models, we include two dichotomous variables for ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants, using na-
tives as the comparison group.20 The results, shown in Table 1, indicate that political engagement is systematically lower
among ﬁrst-generation immigrants than among natives: the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant for the overall measure of
political action as well as in the estimations by action type, but is particularly pronounced in the model of institutionalized par-
ticipation. In contrast to foreigners, we ﬁnd that second-generation immigrants are more politically engaged than native19 The pattern in the overall sample of respondents is the same: the scores for Muslims, Christians, and other believers are 6.893, 6.035, and 6.230,
respectively.
20 We deﬁne natives as respondents who are native-born and whose both parents are native-born.
Fig. 2. Religiosity among ﬁrst and second-generation immigrants by religion type in 18 West European democracies.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 135individuals: the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant for the overall index of political action, although the results by action type
indicate that this relationship is limited to uninstitutionalized political acts.
The results also show that religion plays a complex role in motivating political participation. We ﬁnd that respondents
who belong to Christianity or Islam – 98.83 percent of all believers in our sample – participate in politics less than secularTable 1
Political participation in 18 European countries, 2002–2010.
Independent variables Political action Institutionalized action Uninstitutionalized action
First-generation immigrant .199 (.019) .119 (.011) .080 (.012)
Second-generation immigrant .063 (.015) .003 (.009) .067 (.010)
Religiosity .003 (.002) .003 (.001) .000 (.001)
Muslim .208 (.037) .069 (.023) .135 (.024)
Christian .079 (.009) .002 (.006) .082 (.006)
Other religion .187 (.046) .076 (.027) .115 (.030)
Religious services attendance .049 (.003) .039 (.002) .011 (.002)
Citizen .217 (.024) .100 (.015) .118 (.016)
Social connectedness .085 (.003) .049 (.002) .036 (.002)
Crime victim .246 (.009) .092 (.005) .154 (.006)
Discriminated against .446 (.016) .176 (.010) .270 (.010)
Satisfaction with democracy .003 (.002) .004 (.001) .007 (.001)
Ideological extremity .080 (.003) .034 (.002) .045 (.002)
Male .055 (.007) .125 (.004) .070 (.005)
Age .036 (.001) .021 (.001) .015 (.001)
Age squared .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Married .043 (.008) .058 (.005) .016 (.005)
Education .062 (.001) .027 (.001) .036 (.001)
Unemployed .072 (.017) .016 (.010) .056 (.011)
Income .013 (.005) .019 (.003) .006 (.003)
GDP per capita (in 1,000 of $’s) .004 (.002) .002 (.001) .003 (.001)
Economic growth (%) .001 (.002) .001 (.001) .000 (.001)
Government effectiveness .076 (.024) .019 (.012) .040 (.016)
Foreign population size (%) .007 (.002) .004 (.001) .004 (.001)
Average political participation .820 (.047) .881 (.052) .886 (.044)
Constant 2.315 (.087) 1.411 (.043) .918 (.058)
Variance components
Country level .008 (.003) .001 (.000) .004 (.001)
Individual level 1.308 (.006) .477 (.002) .551 (.002)
Number of observations 98,876 99,438 99,042
Number of groups 18 18 18
Wald X2 (df) 12,129.9 (25) 8371.2 (25) 10,458.4 (25)
Note: Results are multi-level (random intercept) linear regression estimates (using STATA’s xtmixed command). Numbers in parentheses represent standard
errors. p < .05, p < .01, p < .001 (two-tailed). Natives are the reference category for the ﬁrst and second generation immigrants, and non-religious – for
religious groups.
136 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144individuals and that this is particularly true for Muslims.21 At the same time, however, the coefﬁcient for exposure to religious
institutions is in the opposite direction, as people who attend religious services more frequently are also more engaged in pol-
itics. Furthermore, the results by action type reveal that while Christians participate in uninstitutionalized political acts less and
are indistinguishable from non-religious with respect to institutionalized political acts, belonging to Islam is negatively associ-
ated with both types of political action. Hence, our analysis so far shows that immigrant generation and religion matter in shap-
ing people’s political engagement. However, statistically speaking, the estimates do not show conclusively whether
participation rates among religious Muslims are signiﬁcantly different from participation rates among secular individuals or
whether this relationship is conditioned by immigrant generation. Furthermore, the results do not shed any light on the ques-
tion of whether religion continues to be linked to participation once we take into account immigrant experiences more fully,
that is, for example, when we control for democratic socialization in immigrants’ country of origin and the duration of stay
in one’s host country. To do so, we turn to a more detailed analysis of ﬁrst and second-generation immigrants.The results by immigrant generation
To examine whether and how different aspects of religion are linked to immigrants’ political participation, and to see if
the strength of these relationships depend on immigrant generation, we proceed with estimating our models separately for
the foreign-born and second-generation immigrants. The results of these split-sample estimations include the same control
variables as in Table 1, and three additional variables designed to account for immigrant-speciﬁc experiences: political
socialization measured as the level of democracy in the country of origin before immigrant’s arrival, the duration of stay
in one’s host society, and having one foreign-born parent (as opposed to two foreign-born parents). We ﬁrst report the re-
sults of our additive models, including controls, followed by models with interaction terms between religiosity and religion
type. The results of these estimations are shown in Table 2 for the overall political action measure, and in Table 3 – sepa-
rately for institutionalized and uninstitutionalized political acts.
Table 2 reveals that, generally speaking, belonging to a religion – be it Christianity, Islam, or other religion – is associated
with less political action. Hence, in line with our expectations in Hypothesis 2, believers participate in politics less than sec-
ular individuals. This ﬁnding is consistent across immigrant generations and religious groups, although belonging to a reli-
gion other than Christianity or Islam fails to achieve statistical signiﬁcance among second-generation immigrants.
Interestingly, the negative coefﬁcient of being a Muslim is larger among second-generation than ﬁrst-generation immigrants,
and it is considerably larger than the estimate for being a Christian.
We also ﬁnd that immigrants who attend religious services more frequently are more active in politics. The positive rela-
tionship between exposure to religious institutions and political participation indicates a failure to reject Hypothesis 1. Inter-
estingly, the coefﬁcient of exposure to religious institutions is almost twice as large among second-generation immigrants as
among ﬁrst-generation immigrants, suggesting that religious institutions may be more effective in mobilizing second-gen-
eration immigrants than foreign-born. Religiosity in itself is statistically insigniﬁcant, but the interactive models reveal that
the intensity of religious beliefs and political action are linked in a less than straightforward way. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
while being a Muslim is associated with less engagement in politics, religiosity appears to increase political activity among
second-generation Muslim immigrants.22 Taken together, our results indicate a failure to reject Hypothesis 3 that religiosity
interacts with Muslim identity in shaping immigrant political engagement. Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 4, we ﬁnd that
this relationship is limited to second-generation immigrants, while the interaction between religiosity and being a Muslim
has no observable association with political action among foreign-born.
The control variables show some interesting patterns as well. Grievances, such as feeling discriminated against and being
a crime victim, have a consistent positive effect on political participation. Immigrants with extreme ideological views par-
ticipate in politics more than ideologically moderate newcomers, but satisfaction with democracy has a statistically signif-
icant (negative) coefﬁcient only among ﬁrst-generation immigrants. We also ﬁnd that social connectedness, education, and
age are consistently linked to higher levels of political action, while other demographic variables, such as income, marital
status, and gender, have no observable effect. Macro-level controls indicate that immigrants participate in politics more if
they live in countries with generally more politically active populations, and that larger share of foreign-born individuals
provides an additional boost for second-generation immigrants to engage politically. Moreover, foreigners socialized in more
democratic countries participate in their host societies more than newcomers from less democratic regimes, while recent
arrivals predictably engage in politics less than foreign-born individuals who settled in their adopted homeland long time
ago. Finally, having one native-born parent facilitates political engagement among both ﬁrst- and second-generation immi-
grants, but the effect is stronger among foreign-born.
The results reported in Table 3 reveal that the relationship between religion and political participation depends not only
on immigrant generation but also on political action type. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the interaction between religiosity and
Islam has a positive coefﬁcient, but this ﬁnding is limited to uninstitutionalized political engagement among second-gener-
ation immigrants. Hence, we fail to reject Hypothesis 5 that heightened religiosity among Muslims is more strongly linked to21 Interestingly, the coefﬁcient for belonging to a religion other than Christianity or Islam is in the opposite direction, but should not be over-interpreted
considering the small size and diversity of this category.
22 Political action increases with religiosity also among second-generation immigrants who belong to other religions, but not among Christians.
Table 2
Political action by immigrant generation in 18 European democracies, 2002–2010.
Independent variable First-generation immigrants Second-generation immigrants
Religiosity .004 (.005) .004 (.007) .000 (.007) .008 (.008)
Muslim .134 (.051) .112 (.120) .246 (.095) .760 (.277)
ReligiosityMuslim – .003 (.017) – .078 (.038)
Christian .143 (.034) .167 (.062) .144 (.039) .193 (.068)
ReligiosityChristian – .004 (.010) – .013 (.012)
Other religion .180 (.078) .003 (.175) .109 (.142) .555 (.306)
ReligiosityOther religion – .029 (.026) – .121 (.048)
Religious services attendance .027 (.010) .027 (.010) .057 (.014) .055 (.014)
Citizen .050 (.032) .050 (.032) .223 (.073) .219 (.073)
One foreign-born parent .141 (.045) .141 (.045) .105 (.038) .104 (.038)
Social connectedness .072 (.009) .072 (.009) .087 (.011) .087 (.011)
Satisfaction with democracy .028 (.006) .028 (.006) .004 (.007) .003 (.007)
Crime victim .315 (.032) .314 (.032) .199 (.036) .200 (.036)
Discriminated against .219 (.038) .219 (.038) .468 (.055) .473 (.055)
Ideological extremity .068 (.009) .068 (.009) .111 (.011) .110 (.011)
Male .002 (.027) .002 (.027) .040 (.031) .038 (.031)
Age .031 (.005) .031 (.005) .042 (.005) .042 (.005)
Age squared .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Married .063 (.029) .064 (.029) .015 (.035) .015 (.035)
Education .053 (.003) .053 (.003) .069 (.004) .069 (.004)
Unemployed .113 (.050) .113 (.050) .003 (.066) .008 (.066)
Income .002 (.017) .002 (.017) .008 (.021) .008 (.021)
GDP per capita (in 1,000 of $’s) .002 (.004) .002 (.004) .005 (.005) .005 (.005)
Economic growth (%) .002 (.007) .002 (.007) .016 (.009) .016 (.009)
Government effectiveness .122 (.069) .121 (.069) .099 (.079) .096 (.078)
% foreign-born .002 (.005) .002 (.005) .017 (.006) .017 (.006)
Average political participation .515 (.111) .513 (.111) .806 (.133) .807 (.132)
Democracy in country of origin .005 (.002) .005 (.002) – –
Recent arrival .129 (.015) .129 (.015) – –
Contant 1.359 (.187) 1.362 (.187) 2.292 (.206) 2.286 (.205)
Variance components
Country level .006 (.004) .006 (.004) .008 (.004) .007 (.004)
Individual level 1.178 (.020) 1.178 (.020) 1.461 (.026) 1.458 (.026)
Number of observations 6,961 6,961 6,269 6,269
Number of groups 18 18 18 18
Wald X2 (df) 1085.6 (26) 1088.3 (29) 946.9 (24) 960.9 (27)
Note: The results are multi-level (random intercept) linear regression estimates (using STATA’s xtmixed command). Numbers in parentheses represent
standard errors. p < .05, p < .01, p < .001 (two-tailed). Non-religious are the reference category for religious groups; the reference category for ‘one
foreign-born parent’ is having both foreign-born parents.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 137uninstitutionalized than institutionalized political engagement. In contrast, while attendance of religious services is associ-
ated with more political engagement among all respondents, this relationship among immigrants is limited to institution-
alized channels. Taken together, the results suggest that while religious institutions help mobilize immigrants for
institutionalized political engagement, religiosity appears to motivate second-generation Muslims to engage in uninstitu-
tionalized political acts.23
How much do religion and religiosity matter for immigrant political behavior in substantive terms? Using the results
from the interaction models for second-generation immigrants, Fig. 3 reports the predicted values of uninstitutionalized
political participation among second-generation Muslim, Christian, and secular individuals. The white bars indicate the lev-
els of political engagement among respondents with low levels of religiosity and grey bars – among individuals with high
levels of religiosity (calculated as ±2 SD from the mean of one’s religious group among second-generation immigrants), while
the vertical bars report the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The results reveal that religiosity is indeed strongly linked to uninstitutionalized political action among second-generation
Muslim immigrants. Political engagement increases from .441 to .990 when we compare Muslims with low and high levels of
religiosity (a difference of .549), and this difference is statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the levels of participation in politics
are barely distinguishable among Christians when we move from low to high levels of religiosity (.726 vs. .749). We also ﬁnd
that secular individuals are more politically engaged (with a score of .852) than Christians of any religiosity level and slightly
less active than highly religiousMuslims (.990), but these differences are statistically insigniﬁcant. At the same time, however,23 We performed a number of analyses to test the robustness of our ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, we re-estimated our models using (1) life satisfaction that was
previously employed by Dalton and his colleagues as an alternative measure of grievances (Dalton et al., 2010; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005); (2) respondents’
internal efﬁcacy and proﬁciency in ofﬁcial host country’s language; and (3) countries’ openness towards immigrants in a form of citizenship policy regimes
(Howard, 2009), migrant integration policies (MIPEX, Niessen et al., 2007), and anti-immigrant attitudes among natives. The results (available from the authors
upon request) revealed that our ﬁndings do not change as a consequence of controlling for these variables and our inferences remain the same.
Table 3
Institutionalized and uninstitutionalized political action by immigrant generation in 18 European democracies, 2002–2010.
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Note: The results are multi-level (random intercept) linear regression estimates (using STATA’s xtmixed command). Numbers in parentheses represent
standard errors. p < .05, p < .01, p < .001 (two-tailed). Non-religious are the reference category for religious groups.
Fig. 3. Predicted effects of religion and religiosity on uninstitutionalized political action among second-generation immigrants in 18 West European
democracies.
138 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144secular individuals clearly exhibit more political activism than Muslims with low levels of religiosity. Taken together, the re-
sults reveal that political engagement among second-generationMuslims increaseswith religiosity, but heightened religiosity
merely brings their political activism to the same level as the one observed in the secular public.
To assess the substantive and statistical signiﬁcance of our key variables of interest in more detail, Fig. 4 reports how the
magnitude of the marginal effect of religiosity (with 95% conﬁdence intervals) on uninstitutionalized political action changes
when we compare Muslims and non-Muslims among second-generation immigrants. Consistent with our expectations, the
marginal effect of religiosity among Muslims is positive and statistically distinguishable from 0, while the marginal effect for
non-Muslims is both statistically and substantively insigniﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that one unit change in religiosity is
Fig. 4. Marginal effect of religiosity on uninstitutionalized political action among second-generation muslim and non-muslim immigrants in 18 Western
democracies.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 139associated with a .0603 increase in engagement in uninstitutionalized political action among Muslims. This means that mov-
ing from the minimum to the maximum value of religiosity (on a scale from 0 to 10) is associated with a .603 increase in the
score of uninstitutionalized political action (that is, a change from .289 to .892 on a scale from 0 to 3).24
The magnitude of this substantive relationship between religion and political participation among second-generation
Muslim immigrants (.603) is similar or even higher than the effects of some traditional predictors of political participation,
such as age and education. For example, if we compare the scores of uninstitutionalized political action of respondents aged
18 and 45 (that is, the age when political activism appears to peak), the difference is only .112 (.743 vs. .855). Receiving
12 years of full-time education in comparison to no education at all increases the score of uninstitutionalized political action
by .492 points (.328 vs. .820), while 16 years of full-time education (an equivalent of a BA degree in many countries) in com-
parison to no education is associated with a .656 point increase in uninstitutionalized political acts (.330 vs. .984). Taken
together, the results indicate that religiosity is strongly linked to uninstitutionalized political mobilization among second-
generation Muslim immigrants in Western Europe.Conclusion
The relationships between migration, religion, and political action form a hot triangle in contemporary political debates in
many European countries. By providing a systematic analysis on how these factors are related, our study speaks to an on-
going debate over the future of Islam in contemporary democracies. As Muslims have increased their presence in Europe,
concerns about their integration are at the core of political debates and policy agendas in many western societies. The
key concerns revolve around whether immigrants – especially those from culturally distinct societies – should and can inte-
grate into their new homeland, whether their religious beliefs are compatible with the key principles of democratic gover-
nance, and what consequences integration efforts (or lack of thereof) might have for the prospects of peaceful coexistence
and constructive dialogue among different religions as well as between believers and the secular public.
To respond to these debates, we analyze whether immigrants’ engagement in political action is linked to their religious
afﬁliation, and the extent to which these relationships are conditioned by immigrant generation, religiosity, and the nature
of political action. It is a key ﬁnding of this paper that among Muslim immigrants not only is religiosity stronger among sec-
ond-generation than foreign-born, but also that the relationship between religiosity and uninstitutionalized political action
is more pronounced in the second-generation. We attribute this ﬁnding to different attitudes towards host society in the two
immigrant generations. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst-generation immigrants self-select into the process of migration, choosing countries
where they believe they will have a better life than in their country of origin. As a consequence, they are more positively
predisposed towards their host societies than second-generation immigrants who were born into their status instead of
becoming immigrants by choice. Being born in their host society – yet not feeling fully at home due to the way society at
large perceives them – second-generation immigrants are more inclined to rediscover and embrace the roots of their identity
– including religion, cultural traditions and practices. This turn to ‘‘reactive identity’’ – often taken as a way of dealing with
discrimination and injustice25 – then motivates political engagement among Muslim immigrants in an effort to create and se-
cure conditions where they can properly practice their beliefs.24 We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables – at their medians.
25 The ESS data indicate that while 42% of second-generation Muslim immigrants reported feeling discriminated against in their host country, only 32% of
foreign-born Muslims expressed such a view. Similarly, second-generation Muslim immigrants are signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with the way democracy works in
their host country than ﬁrst-generation Muslim immigrants: the mean scores are 5.89 and 6.60, respectively. Hence, socio-political grievances are higher
among second-generation Muslims than foreign-born Muslims.
140 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144Although political activism among second-generation Muslim immigrants increases with the intensity of their religious
convictions, it is worth noting that heightened religiosity merely brings their political activism to the same level as the one
observed in the secular public. In other words, highly religious Muslims are indistinguishable from non-believers, while the
least devout Muslims participate signiﬁcantly less than non-believers. In comparison, there is little difference in the levels of
political participation between Christians of any religiosity level and secular individuals. Hence, religion – be it Christian or
Muslim – in itself does not drive political activity. But belonging to a religion that is distinct and less accepted by the major-
ity public, such as Islam, and holding intense religious beliefs can encourage believers to participate in politics as much as the
secular public does. This is because religion has aspects which could lead the individual away from political strife and con-
ﬂict, as religious beliefs and upholding praying routines take precedence over worldly affairs and considerations. At the same
time religion has a motivational component, which in combination with particular conditions may lead to increased political
activity. Speciﬁcally, religion shapes people’s views towards a wide range of issues – such as abortion, gay marriage, or alco-
hol prohibition – that may stimulate political action. Moreover, the need to take time off for prayers, build places of worship,
or acquire permission to wear the veil in public places may directly raise political involvement amongmore devout believers.
In sum, religion is a complex phenomenon and its relationship to politics is not always easy to predict.
Several other empirical ﬁndings are also of interest. Citizenship is positively related to participation, as are grievances,
such as feeling discriminated against and being a crime victim. These ﬁndings are interesting in light of the classic studies
of political action (Barnes et al., 1979) and more recent research (Dalton et al., 2010) which downplay the role of grievances
and emphasize the role of modernization and development in societies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that if an immigrant comes
from a more democratic country, political activity in the new country is higher than for arrivals from less democratic coun-
tries. Our results also show that immigrants who have lived in the new country for a short period of time are less involved in
political participation than those who have stayed for a longer period, suggesting that political integration takes place not
only across immigrant generations but also with exposure to a host society over one’s life-time among the foreign-born.
These ﬁndings point to interesting dynamics and interactions of the political life courses of immigrants with macro charac-
teristics of countries that the migrants left behind as well as with characteristics of the countries of arrival.
Overall, our paper shows that religion is strongly linked to immigrants’ political engagement, especially when immigrant
generation is taken to account. Future research should further examine the political consequences of immigrant identity by
taking into account other aspects, such as language, ethnicity and race. Existing research shows that, like religion, ethnicity
can both motivate and inhibit political participation of minorities (Sandovici and Listhaug, 2010), but little is knownwhether
this is equally true for immigrants as it is for native minority populations in contemporary democracies.26 Moreover, research
would also beneﬁt from more detailed analyses whether divisions within Islam (e.g., between Sunnis and Shiites) leave a mark
on political behavior of Muslim immigrants in Western societies as they do in other parts of the world. In short, future studies
on these issues would enable us to develop a more comprehensive understanding on how various aspects of immigrant identity
contribute to their political activism in contemporary democracies.
Finally, it is worth noting that the political activities we investigate in this article are non-violent in kind. The peaceful
forms of protest which are included in the index for political action – participating in lawful demonstrations, boycotts,
and signing of petitions – are part of the democratic repertoire in democracies and should add to the democratic training
and socialization of immigrants as well as of other groups in the polity. Participation in these forms of political action should
lead to political integration rather than to escalating conﬂicts, and may ultimately prevent more violent manifestations of
immigrants’ grievances. Further research would beneﬁt from more detailed analyses of speciﬁc issues that trigger political
action and whether political movements recruit participants across the divide between immigrants and natives. In the
meantime, we conclude that in light of growing diversity of European societies, understanding the consequences of religion
in shaping immigrant political behavior is an important step towards a constructive inter-faith dialogue, democratic plural-
ism, and continued stability of contemporary democracies.Acknowledgments
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Kristen Ringdal.Appendix A. Measures and coding
Political action: Additive index based on the following survey items: ‘‘There are different ways of trying to improve things
in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? (1)
Contacted a politician, government or local government ofﬁcial, (2) worked in apolitical party or action group, (3) worked in
another organization or association? (4) signed a petition? (5) taken part in a lawful public demonstration, (6) boycotted
certain products?’’ The measure ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.26 Sandovici and Listhaug’s (2010) study is based on both immigrant and native populations, but it does not systematically analyze whether the patterns of
political engagement among immigrants are considerably different from the ones of native minorities.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 141Institutionalized political action: Additive index based on the following survey items: ‘‘There are different ways of trying to
improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the
following? (1) Contacted a politician, government or local government ofﬁcial, (2) worked in apolitical party or action group,
(3) worked in another organisation or association?’’ The measure ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more ac-
tive respondents.
Uninstitutionalized political action: Additive index based on the following survey items: ‘‘There are different ways of trying
to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the
following? (1) signed a petition? (2) taken part in a lawful public demonstration, (3) boycotted certain products? The mea-
sure ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.
First-generation immigrant: ‘‘Were you born in this country?’’ 0 ‘yes’, 1 ‘no’. Foreign-born with both native-born parents
were excluded from the analyses.
Second-generation immigrant: Based on three survey items: ‘‘Were you born in [country]?’’, ‘‘Was your father born in
[country]?’’, and ‘‘Was your mother born in [country]?’’ Coded 1 if a response to the ﬁrst question was ‘yes’ and a response
to the second and/or third question was ‘no’; 0 – otherwise.
Religion: Based on two survey items: ‘‘Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?’’
If so, ‘‘Which one?’’ Using response categories to this survey question, we created dichotomous variables for Muslims, Chris-
tians (the latter includes Roman Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox, or other Christian denomination), and other reli-
gions (Jews, Eastern religions, and other non-Christian religions).
Religiosity: ‘‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?’’ The variable
ranges from 0 (not at all religious), to 10 (very religious).
Religious services attendance: ‘‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend
religious services nowadays?’’ The variable ranges from 0 (never), to 6 (every day).
Democracy in country of origin: Based on survey questions: ‘‘Were you born in [country]?’’ If a respondent said ‘‘no’’, then
the follow up question was ‘‘In which country were you born?’’ and ‘‘How long ago did you ﬁrst come to live in [country]?’’
Information about immigrant country of origin and the recency of immigrant arrival were then matched up with the polity
scores from the Polity IV data set http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Since recency of immigrant arrival is a categorical var-
iable that captures only approximate number of years in host country, we calculated variable values in the following way. If a
survey was conducted in 2002, then those who arrived more than 20 years ago were assigned the average value of the 1972–
1981 polity score in their country of origin, those who arrived 11–20 years ago the 1982–1991 score, those who arrived 6–
10 years ago the 1992–1996 score, those who arrived 1–5 years ago the 1997–2001 score, and those who arrived within the
last year the 2002 score. We then calculated values separately for respondents interviewed in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, and 2010. This generated a variable that ranges from 0 ‘least democratic regime’ to 20 ‘most democratic regime’
(recoded from the original polity measure that ranges from 10 to 10).
Recent arrival: ‘‘How long ago did you ﬁrst come to live in [country]?’’ 5 ‘within last year’, 4 ‘1–5 years ago’, 3 ‘6–10 years
ago’, 2 ‘11–20 years ago’, 1 ‘more than 20 years ago’.
Citizenship status: ‘‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’’ 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.
One foreign-born parent: 1 ‘One Foreign-born Parent’, 0 ‘Both Foreign-born Parents.’
Age: Number of years (calculated by subtracting respondent’s year of birth from the year of interview).
Male: 1 ‘male’, 0 ‘female’.
Married: 1 ‘married’, 0 ‘otherwise’.
Education: Years of full-time education completed.
Income: ‘‘Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowa-
days?’’ 0 ‘very difﬁcult on present income’, 1 ‘difﬁcult on present income’, 2 ‘coping on present income’, 3 ‘living comfortably
on present income’.
Unemployed: Based on two survey questions: ‘‘Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the
last 7 days? (1) unemployed and actively looking for a job; (2) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job.
This is a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if a respondent gave a positive answer to at least one of these two questions, 0 –
otherwise.
Social connectedness: ‘‘How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?’’ 1 ‘never’, 2 ‘less than
once a month’, 3 ‘once a month’, 4 ‘several times a month’, 5 ‘once a week’, 6 ‘several times a week’, 7 ‘every day’.
Discriminated against: ‘‘Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this
country?’’ 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.
Crime victim: ‘‘Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?’’ 1
‘yes’, 0 ‘no’.
Satisfaction with democracy: ‘‘And on the whole, how satisﬁed are you with the way democracy works in [country]?’’ 0
‘extremely dissatisﬁed’, 10 ‘extremely satisﬁed’.
Ideological extremity: Based on survey question ‘‘In politics people sometimes talk of ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’. Using this card,
where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’’ Using responses to this item
we ﬁrst computed country median left–right position (in each ESS round), and then employed it to calculate absolute dis-
tance between country median and respondent’s position.
142 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144GDP per capita: Based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars (in 1000’s) on the ESS sur-
vey year. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, On-line edition. Washington DC: World Bank (2012).
Economic growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita on the ESS survey year. Source: World Bank, World
Development Indicators, On-line edition. Washington DC: World Bank (2012).
Government effectiveness: Composite measure of perceptions of various agents (including mass public, ﬁrms, non-govern-
mental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations) about the quality of pub-
lic services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Source: World Bank,
Worldwide Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm.
Foreign population size: % of foreign-born population; calculated using the ESS1-4 data for each country in each ESS round.
Average political participation: A mean value of political participation (political action, institutionalized, or uninstitution-
alized political action, depending on the model) calculated using all respondents in each country (in each ESS round).
References
Aleksynska, M., 2011. Civic participation of immigrants in Europe: assimilation, origin, and destination country effects. The European Journal of Political
Economy 27, 566–585.
Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., 2011. Family ties and political participation. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 817–839.
Almond, G.A., Verba, S., 1963. The Civic Culture. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, MA.
Barnes, S., Kaase, M., Allerbeck, K., Farah, B., Heunks, F., Inglehart, R., Jennings, M.K., Klingemann, H-D., Marsh, A., Rosenmayr, L., 1979. Political Action: Mass
Participation in Five Western Democracies. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
Bass, L.E., Casper, L.M., 2001. Impacting the political landscape: who registers and votes among naturalized Americans? Political Behavior 23, 103–130.
Bateson, R., 2012. Crime victimization and political participation. American Political Science Review 106, 570–587.
Bellin, E., 2008. Faith in politics: new trends in the study of religion and politics. World Politics 60, 315–347.
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006. Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 699–746.
Black, J.H., 1987. The practice of politics in two settings: political transferability among recent immigrants to Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science
20, 731–753.
Black, J.H., Niemi, R., Powell, B.G., 1987. Age and resistance to political learning in a new environment: the case of Canadian immigrants. Comparative
Politics 20, 73–84.
Bloemraad, I., 2006. Becoming a citizen in the United States and Canada: structured mobilization and immigrant political incorporation. Social Forces 85,
667–695.
Brady, H.E., Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., 1995. Beyond SES: a resource model of political participation. American Political Science review 89, 271–294.
Branscombe, N.R., Schmitt, M.T., Harvey, R.D., 1999. Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African-Americans: implications for group identiﬁcation
and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77, 135–149.
Bueker, C.S., 2005. Political incorporation among immigrants from ten areas of origin: the persistence of source country effects. International Migration
Review 39, 103–140.
Buijs, F.J., Rath, J., 2002. Muslims in Europe: the state of research. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Buijs, F.J., Rath, J., 2006. Muslims in Europe: The State of Research. IMISCOE Working Paper. <http://www.imiscoe.org/workingpapers/documents/
muslims_in_europe>.
Castles, S., Miller, M.J., 2009. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, fourth ed. Palgrave Macmillan.
Cesari, J., 2004. When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY.
Connor, P., 2010. Contexts of immigrant receptivity and immigrant religious outcomes: the case of Muslims inWestern Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33,
376–403.
Converse, P.E., 1974. Some priority variables in comparative electoral research. In: Rose, R. (Ed.), Electoral behavior: a comparative handbook. Free Press,
New York, pp. 727–745.
Craig, S.C., Maggiotto, M.A., 1981. Political discontent and political action. Journal of Politics 43, 514–522.
Dalton, R.J., 2006. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, fourth ed. CQ Press, Washington, DC.
Dalton, R.J., van Sickle, A., 2005. The Resource, Structural and Cultural Bases of Protest. Center for the Study of Democracy. Paper 05-11. <http://
repositories.cdlib.org/csd/05-11>.
Dalton, R.J., van Sickle, A., Weldon, S., 2010. The individual-institutional nexus of protest behavior. British Journal of Political Science 40, 51–73.
Dancygier, R., Saunders, E.N., 2006. A new electorate? Comparing preferences and partisanship between immigrants and natives. American Journal of
Political Science 50, 962–981.
de Rooij, E.A., 2012. Patterns of immigrant political participation: explaining differences in types of political participation between immigrants and the
majority population in Western Europe. European Sociological Review 28, 455–481.
DeSipio, L., 1996. Making citizens or good citizens? Naturalization as a predictor of organizational and electoral behavior among Latino immigrants.
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 18, 194–213.
Diehl, C., Koenig, M., 2009. Religiosität türkischer migranten im generationenverlauf: ein befund und einige erklärungsversuche. Zeitschrift für Soziologie
38, 300–319.
Djupe, P.A., Grant, J.T., 2001. Religious institutions and political participation in America. Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion 40, 303–314.
Ebaugh, H.R., Chafetz, J.S., 2000. Religion and the New Immigrants. Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations. AltaMira, Walnut Creek, CA.
Eggert, N., Giugni, M., 2011. The impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. In: Morales, L., Giugni, M. (Eds.), Social Capital, Political
Participation and Migration in Europe – Making Multicultural Democracy Work? Palgrave McMillan, pp. 219–237.
Eisinger, P.K., 1973. The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. American Political Science Review 67, 11–28.
Fetzer, J.S., Soper, C.J., 2005. Muslims and the state in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Finkel, S.E., 1985. Reciprocal effects of participation and political efﬁcacy: a panel analysis. American Journal of Political Science 29, 891–913.
Fleischmann, F., Phalet, K., Klein, O., 2011. Religious identiﬁcation and politicization in the face of discrimination: support for political Islam and political
action among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe. British Journal of Social Psychology 50, 628–648.
Fleischmann, F., Phalet, K., 2012. Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation in Europe: a comparative analysis across four capital
cities. Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, 320–341.
Foley, M.W., Hoge, D.R., 2007. Religion and the New Immigrants: How Faith Communities form Our Newest Citizens. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Foner, N., Alba, R., 2008. Immigrant religion in the US and Western Europe: bridge or barrier to inclusion? International Migration Review 42, 577–592.
Gamson, W.A., 1968. Power and Discontent. Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL.
Giugni, M., 2007. Useless protest? A time-series analysis of the policy outcomes of ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements in the United States, 1977–
1995. Mobilization: An. International Quarterly 12, 53–77.
Grzymala-Busse, A., 2012. Why comparative politics should take religion (more) seriously. Annual Review of Political Science 15, 421–442.
A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144 143Gurr, T.R., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Haddad, Y.Y., 2007. The post-9/11 hijab as icon. Sociology of Religion 68, 253–267.
Hansen, S.B., 1997. Talking about politics: gender and contextual effects on political proselytizing. Journal of Politics 59, 73–103.
Harris, F.C., 1994. Something within: religion as a mobilizer of African–American political activism. Journal of Politics 56, 42–68.
Hirschman, C., 2004. The role of religion in the origins and adaptation of immigrant groups in the United States. International Migration Review 38, 1206–
1233.
Hopkins, N., Kahani-Hopkins, V., 2004. Identity construction and British Muslims’ political activity: beyond rational actor theory. British Journal of Social
Psychology 43, 339–356.
Howard, M.M., 2009. The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Inglehart, R., Welzel, C., 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge University Press, New York,
NY.
Jamal, A., 2005. The political participation and engagement of Muslim Americans: mosque involvement and group consciousness. American Political
Research 33, 521–544.
Jennings, M.K., 1983. Gender roles and inequalities in political participation: results from an eight-nation study. Western Political Quarterly 36, 364–385.
Jennings, M.K., van Deth, J.W., Barnes, S., Fuchs, D., Heunks, F., Inglehart, R., Kaase, M., Klingemann, H.-D., Thomassen, J., 1989. Continuities in political
action: a longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies. De Gruyter, New York, NY.
Jeung, R., Chen, C., Park, J.Z., 2012. Introduction: religious, racial and ethnic identities of the new second generation. In: Chen, C., Jeung, R. (Eds.), Sustaining
Faith Traditions in America: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion Among the Latino and Asian American Second Generation. NYU Press, New York, NY, pp. 1–22.
Jones-Correa, M., Leal, D., 2001. Political participation: does religion matter? Political Research Quarterly 54, 751–770.
Jowell, R., Roberts, C., Fitzgerald, R., Gillian, E., 2007. Measuring Attitudes Cross-nationally: Lessons from the European Social Survey. Sage, London.
Just, A., Anderson, C.J., 2012. Immigrants, citizenship, and political action. British Journal of Political Science 42, 481–509.
Kaase, M., 1989. Mass participation. In: Jennings, M.K., van Deth, J.W. (Eds.), with Barnes, S.H., Fuchs, D., Heunks, F.J., Inglehart, R., Kaase, M., Klingemann, H-
D., Thomassen, J. Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies. de Gruyter, Berlin/New
York.
Kalyvas, S., 1996. The rise of Christian democracy in Europe. Cornell Univeristy Press, Ithaca, NY.
Kitschelt, H., 1986. Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science 16,
57–85.
Kittilson, M.C., 2009. Research resources in comparative political behavior. In: Dalton, R.J., Klingemann, H.-D. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political
Behavior. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 865–895.
Klausen, J., 2005. The Islamic Challenge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Politics and religion in Western Europe.
Knutsen, O., 2004. Religious denomination and party choice in western Europe: a comparative longitudinal study from eight countries, 1970–97.
International Political Science Review 25, 97–128.
Koenig, M., 2005. Incorporating Muslim migrants in western nation states. A comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Journal of
International Migration and Integration 6, 219–234.
Kurien, P., 2005. Being young, brown, and Hindu: the identity struggles of second-generation Indian Americans. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 34,
434–469.
Laurence, J., 2006. Managing transnational Islam: Muslims and the state in Western Europe. In: Parsons, C., Smeeding, T. (Eds.), Immigration and the
transformation of Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 253–275.
Leighley, J., 1995. Attitudes, opportunities, and incentives: a ﬁeld essay on political participation. Political Research Quarterly 48, 181–209.
Lemaitre, G., Thoreau, C., 2006. Estimating the Foreign Born Population on Current Basis. Unpublished manuscript, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.
Liang, Z., 1994. Social contact, social capital and the naturalization process: evidence from six immigrant groups. Social Science Research 23, 407–437.
Lijphart, A., 1979. Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting: the ‘‘crucial experiment’’ of comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland. American
Political Science Review 73, 442–457.
Lipset, S.M., 1994. The social requisites of democracy revisited. American Sociological Review 59, 1–22.
Lipset, S.M., Rokkan, S., 1967. Party Systems and Voting Alignments. Free Press, New York.
Maussen, M., 2007. The governance of Islam in Western Europe: a state of the art report. IMISCOE working paper No.16, IMES/University of Amsterdam.
<http://www.ﬂw.ugent.be/cie/documenten/GovernanceofIslam.pdf>.
Maxwell, R., 2010. Evaluating migrant interaction: political attitudes across generations in Europe. International Migration Review 44, 25–52.
McCarthy, J., Zald, M., 1977. Resource mobilization and social movements: a partial theory. American Journal of Sociology 82, 1212–1241.
McAdam, D., 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D., Zald, M.N. (Eds.), 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and
Cultural Framings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, MA.
McAdam, D., Tilly, C., Tarrow, S., 2010. The Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
McVeigh, R., Sikkink, D., 2001. God, politics, and protest: religious beliefs and the legitimation of contentious tactics. Social Forces 79, 1425–1458.
Meyer, D.S., 2004. Protest and political opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology 30, 125–145.
Meyer, D.S., 2006. The politics of protest: social movements in America. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Meyer, D.S., Tarrow, S., (Eds.), 1998. The Social Movement Society. Rowman and Littleﬁeld.
Milbrath, L., Goel, M.L., 1977. Political Participation: How and Why do People get Involved in Politics?, 2nd ed University Press of America, New York.
Miller, W.E., Shanks, J.M., 1996. The new American voter. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A..
Minkenberg, M., 2010. Party politics, religion and elections in western democracies. Comparative European Politics 8, 385–414.
Muller, E.N., 1977. Behavioral correlates of political support. American Political Science Review 71, 454–467.
Muller, E.N., 1979. Aggressive Political Participation. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Nie, N.H., Verba, S., Kim, J.-O., 1971. The modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
Nielsen, J.S., 1999. Towards a European Islam. Palgrave Macmillan Press.
Niessen, J., Huddleston, T., Citron, L., 2007. Migrant Integration Policy Index. British Council and Migration Policy Group, Brussels.
Norris, P., 2002. Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Olson, M., 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Open Society Foundation, 2011. Unveiling the Truth. Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the Full-face Veil in France. At Home in Europe Project.
Peek, L., 2005. Becoming Muslim: the development of religious identity. Sociology of Religion 66, 215–242.
Permoser, J.M., Rosenberger, S., Stoeckl, K., 2010. Religious organizations as political actors in the context of migration: Islam and orthodoxy in Austria.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, 1463–1481.
Peterson, S.A., 1992. Church participation and political participation: the spillover effect. American Politics Quarterly 20, 123–139.
Pew Research Center, 2011. The Future of the Global Muslim Population. The Pew Forum report on religion & public life.
Portes, A., Rumbaut, R.G., 2001. Legacies: The Story of The Immigrant Second Generation. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Portes, A., Zhou, M., 1993. The new second generation: segmented assimilation and its variants. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 53, 74–97.
Ramadan, T., 2004. Western Muslims and the future of Islam. Oxford University Press, New York.
Ramakrishnan, K.S., 2005. Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
144 A. Just et al. / Social Science Research 43 (2014) 127–144Rosenstone, S.J., Hansen, M., 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. Macmillan, New York, NY.
Sandovici, M.E., Listhaug, O., 2010. Ethnic and linguistic minorities and political participation in Europe. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 51,
111–136.
Scheve, K., Stasavage, D., 2006. Religion and preferences for social insurance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, 255–286.
Schmitt, M.T., Branscombe, N.R., 2002. Meaning and consequences of perceived discrimination in advantaged and privileged social groups. European Review
of Social Psychology 12, 167–199.
Shingles, R.D., 1981. Black consciousness and political participation: the missing link. American Political Science Review 75, 76–91.
Snijders, T.A.B., Bosker, R., 1999. Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Steenbergen, M.R., Jones, B.S., 2002. Modeling multilevel data structures. American Journal of Political Science 46, 218–237.
Van Aelst, P., Walgrave, S., 2001. Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalisation of protest to the normalisation of the protester. European
Journal of Political Research 39, 461–486.
Verba, S., Nie, N.H., 1972. Participation in America. Harper & Row, New York, NY.
Verba, S., Nie, N.H., Kim, J.-O., 1978. Participation and Political Equality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., Brady, H.E., 1995. Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Verkuyten, M., Yildiz, A.A., 2007. National (dis)identiﬁcation and ethnic and religious identity: a study among Turkish Dutch Muslims. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 33, 1448–1462.
Voas, D., Fleischmann, F., 2012. Islam moves west: religious change in the ﬁrst and second generations. Annual Review of Sociology 38, 525–545.
Voicu, B., Serban, M., 2012. Immigrant involvement in voluntary associations in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, 1569–1587.
Wald, K.D., Wilcox, C., 2006. Getting religion: has political science rediscovered the faith factor? American Political Science Review 100, 523–529.
Wald, K.D., Silverman, A.L., Fridy, K., 2005. Making sense of religion in political life. Annual Review of Political Science 8, 121–143.
Welzel, C., Deutsch, F., 2011. Emancipative values and nonviolent protest: the importance of ‘ecological’ effects. British Journal of Political Science 42, 465–
479.
White, S., Nevitte, N., Blais, A., Gidengil, E., Fournier, P., 2008. The political resocialization of immigrants. Political Research Quarterly 61, 268–281.
Wolﬁnger, R.E., Rosenstone, S.J., 1980. Who Votes? Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Wright, M., Bloemraad, I., 2012. Is there a trade-off between multiculturalism and socio-political integration? Policy regimes and immigrant incorporation
in comparative perspective. Perspectives on Politics 10, 77–95.
Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., Anisman, H., 2010. Religiosity as identity: toward an understanding of religion from a social identity perspective. Personality and
Social Psychology Review 14, 60–71.
